INTRODUCTION
Pervis Payne is a polite, somewhat naïve, mentally handi-
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sion. In Payne v. Tennessee, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment does not pose a per se bar to victim impact statements in capital cases 10 -a decision that stands in direct opposition to the legal principles that existed at the beginning of Pervis Payne's case.
11
Certainty is essential in the law. Nowhere is this maxim more important than in a capital sentencing decision because "death is different." 12 In a common law system, certainty is achieved through stare decisis. 13 As Justice Stewart wrote in Woodson v. North Carolina:
The penalty of death is different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.
14 Because "death is different," 15 a capital jury's sentencing discretion must be tempered by "clear and objective standards as to produce a non-discriminatory application." 16 Further, a capital sentencing statute must provide a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which the [death penalty is imposed] from the many cases [in] which it is not." 17 To fulfill the "Gregg mandate," 18 most states have adopted statutes which enumerate certain aggravating factors that the prosecutor must prove before 10 Payne v. Tennesse, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). 11 Id. at 830. 12 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (invalidating a mandatory death penalty scheme because it both failed to address the concern of unbridled jury discretion raised in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and did not allow for individualized sentencing determinations). 13 Respect for precedent promotes certainty, allowing individuals to "arrange their affairs with confidence," assured that the law applied to them in the future will be the same as currently applied. William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949) .
14 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. 15 Id. 16 Compare Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (upholding a capital sentencing scheme which guides the jury's discretion through the use of statutorily prescribed aggravating factors) with Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (striking a capital sentencing scheme allowing for complete jury discretion). 17 Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-429 (1980) (holding the use of "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman," before the term "offense," is an aggravating factor that is unconstitutional because all murders could be described as such and therefore no meaningful narrowing function is served). 18 See Tim Kaine, Capital Punishment and the Waiver of Sentence Review, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 483, 518 (1983) .
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20
In addition to the requirement that a capital sentencing scheme provide objective guidelines that meaningfully narrow the class of death-eligible defendants, there is a seemingly contradictory individualized sentencing requirement. To withstand constitutional muster a sentencing scheme must allow for "particularized considerations of relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant." 21 This mandate has been interpreted as a requirement that a sentencer must consider, as a mitigating factor, "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." 22 Since Woodson, the guiding principle that "death is different" has been a cornerstone of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The Court has consistently held that the Eighth Amendment provides additional procedural protections for defendants when the possible punishment is death. 23 This principle has given rise to two procedural mandates, out of which an unworkable tension arises. One mandate requires that a capital scheme provide objective guidelines that narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty; the other requires a subjective, open-ended consideration of any mitigating characteristic of the defendant or circumstance of the crime. 24 Juries are left to conduct an impossible undertaking when they are asked to balance a subjective mitigating factor, such as the severe childhood abuse suffered by the defendant, against objective aggravating factors, such as the number of victims killed. This tension has led at least one former Supreme Court Justice, Harry 19 Justice Souter used the phrase "worst of the worst" to describe the Gregg mandate in his dissent in Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) ("Capital punishment must be limited to those offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes and whose extreme culpability makes them "the most deserving of execution.' " (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002))). 20 Other states, such as Texas, fulfill the narrowing mandate by directing special questions to the sentencing jury. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 2005) . 21 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303. 22 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (invalidating the Ohio death penalty statute because it limited mitigating factors to those enumerated in the statute). 23 See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); see also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) . In fact, an electronic Westlaw search for the language "death is different" returns twenty-three U.S. Supreme Court cases, starting with Woodson. 24 For an excellent analysis of how these two mandates contradict each other in areas beyond the admission of victim impact evidence, see Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier 
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Blackmun, to conclude that the death penalty can never be imposed fairly and he would therefore "no longer tinker with the machinery of death." 25 The focus of this Comment is whether victim impact statements-which are non-objective by nature-should be admissible in capital sentencing procedures. This Comment hopes to show that victim impact statements have no place in the determination of whether the capitally accused should live or die.
26 Such evidence, which does not address the defendant's blameworthiness, 27 serves neither of the two contradictory guiding principles of Eighth Amendment law. The seventeen years since Payne have shown us that, in effect, victim impact statements are an arbitrary, non-objective, sentencing factor that is irrelevant to the culpability of the individual defendant.
This Comment first introduces the historical political landscape from which victim impact legislation originates. Part Two examines the limited body of Supreme Court case law regarding victim impact statements. Part Three surveys how the states and federal systems integrated Payne into their legislation and court rulings. After Payne, the state laboratories have shown the decision's deficiencies. Using the states' treatment as a guide, the final part of this paper will dissect the logic of Payne and offer suggestions for living with Payne.
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Since President Reagan first proclaimed observance of a National Crime Victims' Rights Week in 1981, 28 the Victims' Rights Movement has gained momentum. 29 The Victims' Rights Move- Regarding the use of television in lieu of cross examination, see Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850-51 (1990) (holding that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause does not prohibit the use of closed circuit television to avoid face-to-face confrontation with the accused during the cross examination of an allegedly abused child). In his dissent, Justice Scalia wrote:
The "special" reasons that exist for suspending one of the usual guarantees of reliability in the case of children's testimony are perhaps matched by "special" reasons for being particularly insistent upon it in the case of children's testimony. Some studies show that children are substantially more vulnerable to suggestion than adults, and often unable to separate recollected fantasy (or suggestion) from reality. Id. at 868 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He points to three works, which speak to the vulnerability of children to suggestion. 708-11 (1987) .
Scalia begins his dissent with, "Seldom has this Court failed so conspicuously to sustain a categorical guarantee of the Constitution against the tide of prevailing current opinion." Craig, 497 U.S. at 860 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This is notably inconsistent with his position on victim impact statements-where he invokes popular opinion to justify his decisions. See infra note 245.
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Behind the movement lies the belief that the Warren Court went too far in ensuring constitutional protections for the accused.
33
The need for retributive justice and a goal of providing a meaningful role for the victim in the criminal justice process also motivates Victims' Rights advocates. 42 This new understanding of the Eighth Amendment was based less on law and more on politics.
The Court cannot have its cake and eat it too. If indeed "all relevant" evidence is admissible, that evidence still must provide "clear and objective standards as to produce a non-discriminatory application." 43 Simply put, victim impact statements are personal and subjective. Victim impact statements, used as an aggravating factor, are far from the "clear and objective standards" envisioned in Gregg.
II. VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
A. Booth v. Maryland
The Victims' Rights Movement emerged in part out of crime victims' perceived marginalization by the criminal justice system, and a conservative backlash to the Warren Court. 44 This loosely defined movement has led to a sweep of legislative reforms ranging in weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, any evidence presented about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family. 39 50 At Booth's sentencing hearing a victim impact statement was provided pursuant to a Maryland statute requiring that a victim impact statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and his or her family be prepared in all felonies. 51 The victim impact statement included statements from the Bronsteins' granddaughter, son-in-law, daughter, and the son who found the victims' bodies two days after the murder. 52 The son testified that, as a result of the murders, he suffered from lack of sleep and depression, and the granddaughter testified that she had attended therapy but stopped because "no one could help her." 48 Booth, 482 U.S at 497. 49 Id. at 502. 50 Id. at 497-98. 51 Id. at 498. MD. CODE ANN., art. 41 § 4-609(c) (1986). When enacted it was unclear whether the Maryland victim impact statute applied to capital sentencing. Originally the law required, victim impact statement "if victim suffered injury." MD. CODE ANN., art. 41 § 4-609(c)(2)(i) (1986) . By the time Booth was decided it was amended to clearly include capital prosecutions. In 1983, the statute was amended to read, "In any case in which the death penalty is requested . . . a presentence investigation, including a victim impact statement, shall be completed by the Division of Parole and Probation . . . " MD. CODE ANN., art. 41 § 4-609(d) (1986).
52 Booth, 482 U.S. at 510. 53 Id. at 499-500.
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The son further testified that his parents were "butchered like animals," and the daughter concluded such a person could "never be rehabilitated." 54 Upon consideration of this evidence, the jury sentenced Booth to death on one murder count and life in prison on the other.
In Booth, the victim impact statement presented to the jury contained two types of information. First, it described personal characteristics of the victims 55 and the emotional impact the crime had on the family. 56 Second, it gave the family's opinions and characterizations of the crimes and the defendant. 57 The Court addressed these two distinct types of evidence separately in its opinion.
Maryland made several arguments defending the admission and consideration of victim impact statements. First, the state argued that evidence of personal characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact the crime had on the family should be admissible as a "circumstance of the crime." 58 The state argued this evidence fully illustrates the harm of the defendant's actions, and, although not an enumerated aggravating factor in the capital sentencing statute, such evidence allows the jury to better assess the "gravity or aggravating quality" of the offense. 59 The state also advanced the idea that victim impact statements are not arbitrary because there is a foreseeable nexus between the murder and the harm caused to the family.
60
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell rejected this argument and invoked the doctrine that "death is different" by stating 54 Id. at 500. 55 For example, the victim impact statement given at Booth's trial read:
[T]he victims' son reports that his parents had been married for fiftythree years and enjoyed a very close relationship, spending each day together. He states that his father had worked hard all his life and had been retired for eight years. He describes his mother as a woman who was young at heart and never seemed like an old lady. She taught herself to play bridge when she was in her seventies. The victims' son relates that his parents were amazing people who attended the senior citizens' center and made many devout friends. As described by their family members, the Bronsteins were loving parents and grandparents whose family was most important to them. Their funeral was the largest in the history of the Levinson Funeral Home and the family received over one thousand sympathy cards, some from total strangers. Booth, 482 U.S. at 499 n.3. 56 Id. 57 Id. 58 Id. at 502. 59 Booth, 482 U.S. at 503-04. 60 Id. at 503.
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" [w] hile the full range of foreseeable consequences of a defendant's actions may be relevant in other . . . contexts, we cannot agree that it is relevant in the unique circumstance of a capital sentencing hearing." 61 To support this assertion, Powell pointed out that some victims might be capable of making impassioned statements articulating their grief. On the other hand, some victims might not leave family members to testify on their behalf, or they might be "less articulate in describing their feelings even though their sense of loss is equally severe." 62 Powell further reasoned that it would be as inappropriate for a jury's decision to impose the death penalty to turn on this distinction, as it would be to permit evidence of the victim's character. Such a consideration is not a "principled way to distinguish [cases] in which the death penalty was imposed from the many cases in which it was not." 63 Further, the Court noted that if a victim impact statement is allowed in a capital sentencing hearing it is difficult-"if not impossible"-to rebut. 64 The problem of rebuttal is two-fold. First, there is a strategic problem for the defendant, since on cross-examination a defendant cannot easily show that "family members exaggerated their sleeplessness, depression or emotional trauma suffered." 65 Second, if victim impact statements are admitted, then it is presumed the defendant can cross-examine the declarant. 66 However, this presentation and rebuttal of evidence creates a "mini-trial" on the victim's character. 67 Besides being unappealing, 68 this mini-trial detracts from the jury's charge to consider the character of the defendant and circumstances of the offense.
69
The Court also addressed a foreseeability issue. The state advanced the argument that a defendant takes the victim as he finds him and that generally defendants are liable for unforeseen consequences of their actions. While case law shows that most defendants do not choose their victims based on the effect that the murder will have on anyone other than victim, Powell did concede
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71
Booth was a five-four decision with Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joining Powell's majority. However, both Justices White and Scalia filed dissenting opinions, each joined by the other. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor joined both dissents. These dissents illustrated the controversial nature of the issue and paved the way for the Payne decision.
White's dissent presented two arguments in favor of upholding the Maryland statute. The first argument is one of straightforward deference to the legislature. 72 White's second argument was that culpability and punishment is determined in large part by the extent of harm caused. 73 White essentially argued that some lives are more valuable than others. 74 Additionally, White addressed the majority's concern about a jury's potential arbitrary decision making. He retorted with a two-wrongs-make-a-right argument and listed the ways that a criminal prosecution is already arbitrary.
75
Justice Antonin Scalia used a different framework to address many of the same points as White. Scalia drew a distinction between "moral blameworthiness" and "personal responsibility." 76 70 Id. at 504 (citing to People v. Levitt, 156 Cal.App.3d 500, 516-17 (Cal. 1984)). 71 Booth, 482 U.S. at 505. 72 Id. at 516 (White, J., dissenting). 73 In this argument White analogizes to a reckless driving case by saying that a person who runs a red light should be punished more lightly than a person who runs a red light and kills a pedestrian. Id. at 516-17 (White, J., dissenting). 74 White does this by pointing to the constitutionality of death penalty statutes qualifying defendants who are accused of police killings (MD. ANN.CODE art. 27 § 413(d)(1) (1982)) or assassination of the President or Vice President (18 U.S.C. § 1751(a) (1982)). Booth, 482 U.S. at 517 (White, J., dissenting). 75 White writes, "No two prosecutors have exactly the same ability to present their arguments to the jury; no two witnesses have exactly the same ability to communicate the facts; but there is no requirement in capital cases that the evidence and argument be reduced to the lowest common denominator." Id. at 517-18. 76 Scalia used three examples to illustrate these two categories. First, a reckless driving case where nobody is injured versus one where a person is killed. Second, a bank-robber who fires and kills his target versus a bank-robber whose gun misfires. Third, the then recently decided Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) , where the Court upheld the death sentence for two non-triggermen involved in a murder. Scalia argues that in each case the blameworthiness of the defendant is the same, but because the result is different the personal responsibility of each is different and therefore each defendant is deserving of a different sentence. Booth, 482 U.S. at 519-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Citing examples, 77 Scalia concluded that although the "moral blameworthiness" of a defendant may be the same regardless of the unintended result of his or her actions, "personal responsibility" is measured by the result. He argued that the majority improperly determined the sentence based on blameworthiness alone and that responsibility should be considered as well. Although artfully written, Scalia's point is quite similar to White's: both argued that society should value some lives more than others and that a defendant's sentence should be determined by the availability and articulateness of the victim's family.
Scalia couched his argument in textualist terms stating, "[i]n sum, the principle upon which the Court's opinion rests-that the imposition of capital punishment is to be determined solely on the basis of moral guilt-does not exist, neither in the text of the Constitution, nor even the opinions of this Court." Unlike White, Scalia did not address the arbitrariness concern on which the Court's opinion truly rests.
78
B. South Carolina v. Gathers
The Booth rule prohibited family members of a murder victim from giving a victim impact statement at a capital sentencing hearing. This rule left unaddressed the question of whether a prosecutor could read a statement about the victim into evidence-that is until Demetrius Gathers was convicted of murder and sentenced to death for a park-bench assault on Richard Haynes. 79 Mr. Haynes 77 See Booth, 482 U.S. at 516-17 (White, J., dissenting). 78 Id. at 520 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia does not recognize that the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence provides protections against arbitrary decision making in capital sentencing. He has written:
Today a petitioner before this Court says that a state sentencing court (1) had unconstitutionally broad discretion to sentence him to death instead of imprisonment, and (2) had unconstitutionally narrow discretion to sentence him to imprisonment instead of death. An observer unacquainted with our death penalty jurisprudence (and in the habit of thinking logically) would probably say these positions cannot both be right . . . . In my view, it is time for us to reexamine our efforts in this area and to measure them against the text of the constitutional provision on which they are purportedly based . . . . Our decision in Furman, 408 U.S. at 238, was arguably supported by this text. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656-670 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). In Payne, Justice Scalia cites to his Walton line and elaborates, "I have previously expressed my belief that the latter requirement is both wrong, and when combined with the remainder of our capital sentencing jurisprudence, unworkable. Payne, 501 U.S. at 833 (Scalia, J., concurring was 31 years old, mentally ill, unemployed, and transient. 80 At the time of his death, Mr. Haynes was carrying several bags containing articles of religious significance, including a copy of the "Game Guy's Prayer," which was read into evidence by the prosecution. These articles were found strewn around the murder scene. 81 At the sentencing phase of Mr. Gathers's trial, the prosecution readmitted all evidence from the guilt phase including the religious items possessed by Mr. Haynes 82 ; no additional evidence was admitted. 83 However, the prosecutor did offer a closing argument that focused extensively on Mr. Haynes's personal traits. The admissibility of this testimony was the issue addressed in Gathers. 84 The Supreme Court of South Carolina concluded that the prosecution's closing argument suggested to the jury that "the appellant deserved a death sentence because the victim was a religious man and registered voter" but that these characteristics "were unnecessary to an understanding of the circumstances of the crime." 85 The state court reversed Gathers's death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding. 88 and "[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender."
89 At the heart of the plurality's reasoning was a reaffirmation of the then recent Booth decision. Citing Booth, the plurality found the prosecutor's statement in Gathers "wholly unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular defendant."
90
In Gathers, Justice Brennan noted that Booth left open the possibility that victim impact statements may be admissible if "re- 80 Id. at 807. 81 Id. 82 Id. at 808. 83 The religious objects were admitted into evidence through the testimony of a Charleston police officer. In holding that the evidence was not relevant to "circumstances of the crime," the majority, as the Court had done in Booth, addressed the issue of foreseeability. Brennan reasoned that the fact Gathers rifled through Haynes's personal belongings for something to steal was indeed relevant as a "circumstance of the crime."
93 However, the content of the belongings, as it may have related to the victim's character, was inadmissible because there was "no evidence whatever that showed that the defendant read anything that was printed."
94
Justice White, a dissenter in Booth, filed a brief concurrence. He acquiesced in the decision as respect for precedent. 95 This concurrence is curious in light of White's choice to join the majority in Payne, which determined that the Eighth Amendment does not per se prohibit a capital sentencing jury from considering victim impact evidence.
96
Justice O'Connor's dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, alluded to the fact she thought Booth was wrongly decided and should be overruled. Her dissent rested on the idea that the case at bar was easy to distinguish from Booth. 97 93 Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811. 94 Id. The prosecutor referred to the victim's prayer card and voter registration card during closing arguments. Both items were found among the victim's belongings scattered around his body, and were admitted into evidence. The prosecutor "conveyed the suggestion appellant deserved a death sentence because the victim was a religious man and a registered voter." Gathers, 490 U.S at 810 (quoting Gathers, 295 S.C. at 484). 95 Id. at 812 (White, J., concurring) (writing that "[u]nless Booth v. Maryland . . . is to be overruled, the judgment below must be affirmed."). 96 O'Connor first restated the facts of the case in a gruesome manner 100 and went on to ground the remainder of her dissent on two intertwined concepts. First, sentencing should be based on moral blameworthiness.
101 Second, capital sentencing should not be one-sided. O'Connor argued that the Lockett and Eddings line of cases, which establish a requirement for individualized sentencing based on the defendant's character and circumstances of the offense, should be balanced by victim impact evidence.
102 These arguments laid out some of the underlying rationale for the Payne decision.
103
Justice Scalia filed a separate, solo dissent in which he minced no words and made no attempt to distinguish this case from Booth. Instead, he argued Booth was wrongly decided and should be overturned.
104
Despite the "spirited" dissents, in practical terms, the Gathers rule simply extended the Booth ban on victim impact statements made by family members of the victim to also include statements made by a prosecutor. This is particularly helpful in the analysis of Payne because there the Supreme Court deemed the prosecutor's statements about the victims constitutionally permissible. Payne's death sentence rested largely on the penalty phase testimony of Charisse's mother and the prosecutor's inflammatory and illegal closing argument. Nicholas's grandmother testified 99 107 The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the conviction and sentence, and rejected Payne's argument that the admission of the grandmother's testimony and the prosecutor's closing argument violated the Eighth Amendment as applied in Booth and Gathers. 108 That court reasoned that although the testimony of the grandmother was "technically irrelevant" it "did not create a constitutionally unacceptable risk of an arbitrary imposition of the death penalty . . . ." 109 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari "to reconsider our holdings in Booth and Gathers that the Eighth Amendment prohibits a capital sentencing jury from considering 'victim impact' evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact of the crimes on the victim's family."
110
In writing Payne's six-member majority opinion, Rehnquist began the analysis by laying a favorable foundation from which to work. Arguably, he over-simplified the Booth/Gathers rule by framing it using two premises: first, evidence relating to a particular victim or harm caused to the victim's family does not reflect on the defendant's blameworthiness, and second, only evidence relevant to a defendant's "blameworthiness" is relevant to capital sentencing. 111 The next portion of his opinion gives historical context for "the principles which have guided criminal sentencing-as opposed to criminal liability . . . ." 112 In this section, Rehnquist built the retributive framework on which the rest of the opinion hangs.
Just In this portion of the argument Chief Justice Rehnquist cites to the book of Exodus, "An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." Notably missing is a citation to Matthew that states "[a]n eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." 5 Matthew 38:39 (King James).
113 Gathers, 490 U.S. at 817 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 114 Payne, 501 U.S. at 839.
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which Booth partially relies 115 was misread as only describing a class of evidence that could be introduced in favor of a defendant. 116 Rehnquist wrote that the allegedly misread precedent "unfairly weighted the scales in a capital trial; while virtually no limits are placed on mitigating evidence, . . . the State is barred from either offering 'a quick glimpse into the life' [of the victim], or demonstrating the loss to the victim's family."
117 Rehnquist borrowed the language for this reasoning from his dissent in Mills; the same dissent O'Connor cited to in her Booth dissent.
Rehnquist went on to address the Booth reasoning that victim impact evidence must be excluded because it creates a "mini-trial on the victim's character" 118 and is impossible to rebut. 119 Rehnquist was not concerned with either the defendant's Hobbesian choice on how to rebut a victim impact statement or the specific relevancy requirements of capital sentencing. 120 Rather, he glossed over these concerns, instead giving voice to the concept that "relevant, unprivileged evidence should be admitted and its weight left to the fact finder."
121
Because Booth was so recently decided, and even more recently extended by Gathers, the rumblings of stare decisis were obvious. Rehnquist tried to address the concern by giving an extensive list of cases where the Court has overturned precedent. The Payne decision stopped short in three areas. First and most obviously, it does not create a constitutional right for victims. It merely allows states to enact victim impact statutes and apply them in the capital sentencing context rather than mandating that states do so. Second, it explicitly limits the holding to the overruling of Booth and Gathers only in regards to their ban on information relating to the victim and impact on his family. 126 In Booth, evidence of a victim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence was held inadmissible. In Payne, no such evidence was at issue. Therefore, that portion of Booth remains intact. Third, Rehnquist recognized the possibility that evidence may be "introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair,"
127 however a prejudiced party should seek remedy through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
128
Justice O'Connor wrote a two-part concurring opinion joined by Justices White and Kennedy. In the first part, O'Connor stressed the federalism implications. States can "choose" not to have victim impact statements in capital sentencing. 129 Further, even if a victim impact statement is unduly inflammatory, there are procedural protections in place. She argued that a defendant can seek refuge in the Fourteenth Amendment and the appellate courts. 130 In the second part, O'Connor specifically addressed Justice Marshall's dissent. She asserted, "I do not think it fair . . . 124 Id. at 824. 125 Id. at 827. 126 Id. at 830 n.2. 127 Id. at 824. 128 Id. at 825. 129 Id. at 830-31. 130 Id. The issue of foreseeability was addressed in a separate concurring opinion by Justice Souter joined by Justice Kennedy. Souter wrote, "[e]very defendant knows, if endowed with the mental competence for criminal responsibility, that the life he will take by his homicidal behavior is that of a unique person, like himself, and that person to be killed probably has close associates, 'survivors,' who will suffer harms and deprivations from the victim's death."
132
Souter went on to state that the purpose of his separate concurrence is his particular displeasure with Booth's "unworkable standard of constitutional relevance." 133 To illustrate the point he grounded his defense for overturning precedent in a separate body of case law from the majority.
134
Two separate dissents were filed that both warned of the potential danger of the majority's precedent and exposed the faulty reasoning behind their opinion. The first, by Justice Marshall and joined by Justice Blackmun, is vitriolic and personal. It starts, "Power, not reason, is the new currency of this Court's decision making." 135 The essence of his dissent is that, because of a personnel change, the Court "declares itself free to discard any concept of constitutional liberty" 136 and create an exception to the general rule of stare decisis. Marshall concluded by cautioning against creating a slippery slope. He warned, "Cast aside today are those condemned to face society's ultimate penalty. Tomorrow's victims may be minorities, women, or the indigent."
137 On June 27, 1991, Marshall resigned his tenure at the Supreme Court-two short hours after reading this dissent from the bench. 
2008]
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS 109
New Jersey, a state with an interesting treatment of the issue, 149 has abolished its death penalty statute. 150 Wyoming has deemed victim impact evidence inadmissible. 151 Further, the treatment of victim impact evidence by certain states defies tidy classification and therefore should be explored in greater detail.
Only two states, New Hampshire 152 and Connecticut, 153 have active death penalty statutes and statutory provisions allowing victim impact evidence, yet have not determined whether such evidence can be used in capital sentencing. Montana case law clearly admits non-testimonial victim impact evidence, but it is unclear whether live victim impact testimony is admissible. 154 Indiana and Mississippi continue their significant limitations on admissibility. (2008) . 149 Until New Jersey abolished the death penalty, it stood alone as the only state among the jurisdictions that permit victim impact evidence. There, the admission of victim impact testimony is permitted only in those cases in which the defendant places his character or record at issue as a mitigating circumstance. State v. Muhammad, 678 A.2d 164, 168 (N.J. 1996). 150 See Peters, supra note 148. 151 Olsen v. Wyoming, 67 P.3d 536, 594 (Wyo. 2003) (held existing Wyoming law does not permit victim impact evidence in capital sentencing). 152 See infra note 201. 153 Connecticut has yet to address the issue directly. However, a statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46d (2008) , permitting victim impact statements in capital sentencing hearings was adopted subsequent to a 2003 trial, no capital statutes have been conducted since its adoption. As such the issue under Connecticut state law, remains open. State v. Rizzo, 833 A.2d 363, 415 n.44 (Conn. 2003) . 154 In Kills On Top v. State, 15 P.3d 422, 438 (Mont. 2000), the Montana Supreme Court noted that they had previously admitted non-testimonial victim impact evidence. The court also noted that Payne expressly overrules Booth. Id. It seems that the latter language is an invitation to expand the Montana rule to include testimonial victim impact evidence as well. 155 In Indiana and Mississippi, both "weighing" states where non-statutory aggravating factors are not considered, victim impact evidence is limited to proving the existence of statutorily enumerated aggravating factors. The Indiana Supreme Court wrote, "[w]ith our determination today that Indiana's statutory death penalty aggravators are the only aggravating circumstances available, the admissibility of the victim impact evidence in the present case hinges upon its relevance to the death penalty statute's aggravating and mitigating circumstances. This section of the paper will first provide a brief overview of victim impact evidence. Second, it will discuss the many jurisdictions that allow victim impact statements. Third, it will discuss the few jurisdictions that, while retaining the death penalty, have barred or significantly limited the admission of victim impact statements. Last, this section will explore the two remaining death penalty jurisdictions to rule on the issue.
A. What is Included in the Term "Victim Impact Evidence"?
The type of victim impact evidence permitted varies across jurisdictions. Because Payne clearly invited states to allow evidence related to the victim's personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the murder on family members, 156 evidence about the victim's good character is probably the most common.
157 Also common is evidence of the victim's talents, 158 intelligence, 159 spirituality, work ethic, educational background, and standing in the community. 160 Similarly, jurisdictions differ in their approach to the permissibility of evidence that the defendant's conduct negatively impacted the law enforcement community. 161 Murder victims' family members have been allowed to testify about a wide range of effects including miscarriages, heart attacks, used to establish an existing aggravating factor listed in the capital sentencing statute, MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5) (1994) . Berry, 703 So. 2d. at 275-276. 156 Payne, 501 U.S. at 827. 157 See, e.g., Roberts v. Bowersox, 61 F. Supp. 2d 896 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (held that victim impact evidence, including witnesses' testimony about the victim's kindness and their close friendship with her, did not improperly or unconstitutionally influence the jury's sentencing determination); Raulerson v. State, 491 S.E.2d 791 (Ga. 1997) (holding admissible testimony read by the prosecutor, including testimony from the first victim's father that, at the time of his death, the victim attended college and planned to marry the second victim; a statement from the second victim's father that she was a senior honor student in high school who planned to marry the first victim; and testimony by the third victim's son that she was a nurse and the divorced mother of two children); State v. Reeves, 448 S.E.2d 802 (N.C. 1994) (holding admissible testimony that the victim was a very good person, that she always went to church, that she was a good wife and mother, would do anything for anyone, and died not knowing what happened to her daughter). Blume, supra note 144, at 269. 158 
Jurisdictions Embracing Payne
Thirty states make victim impact evidence more or less admissible. 170 The federal and military systems also allow victim impact evidence with few restrictions.
171
Prior to legislation, courts in two of these states, Oregon and Utah, had found that victim impact statements were inadmissible, reasoning that they are not relevant to any issue under their capital sentencing statutes. 172 In State v. Guzek the Supreme Court of Oregon reasoned that victim impact evidence, while tending to prove the fact at which it was directed, was immaterial to the special questions directed to the jury. 173 The Oregon legislature amended their death penalty statute to explicitly mention victim impact evidence. 174 192 The unifying theme in these limitations is that the intention of Payne was to provide a "quick glimpse" into the life of the victim. 193 Courts have held that this "quick glimpse" should indeed be quick. 194 Further, victim impact statements from victims of a defendant's previous crimes are typically inadmissible because they are irrelevant to the case for which the defendant is standing trial. 195 The most important limitation on the scope of victim impact evidence is that a victim's family members' characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence are inadmissible. This part of Booth survives in theory and in practice. 196 
C. Two Remaining States: A Last Frontier?
New Hampshire and Connecticut are the remaining two states with active death penalty statutes that have yet to deal with the issue of whether victim impact statements are admissible. Both should reject the logic of Payne and follow Wyoming's example.
The last execution in New Hampshire was in 1939. 197 However, there have been capital prosecutions, 198 and the death penalty statute has remained on the books with the last amendment to the statute occuring in the 1990 legislative session. 199 In the last year, the Attorney General's Office has announced its intent to seek the death penalty in two different cases.
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tencing statute make clear that a judge cannot be the sentencer. 205 In the states that do allow victim impact evidence, the state legislature has explicitly included it in the death penalty statute or separate victim impact statute in which capital punishment is mentioned. 206 Other states will only allow victim impact statements if they are relevant to a statutory aggravating factor. 207 Lastly, the New Hampshire Constitution has been interpreted to be more protective of defendants. 208 The strength of the argument against victim impact evidence in a Connecticut capital hearing is, perhaps, weaker than in New Hampshire. The capital statute specifically mentions inclusion of such evidence. 209 Nonetheless, for all the reasons stated above, Payne is still flawed precedent. Other states have rejected Payne because victim impact evidence is irrelevant and results in arbitrary decisions as to which defendants live and which die. New Hampshire and Connecticut should accept this logic as well.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH PAYNE
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence carves a delicate path between two pillars. Capital sentencing must be based on clear and objective guidelines, which guard against arbitrariness, 210 and must take into account the individualized characteristics of the accused and circumstances of the offense. 211 Victim impact statements, when used in capital sentencing, run head on into both pillars. Not only does this type of evidence make arbitrary the decision of who lives and who dies, but it is irrelevant to the character of the defendant and circumstance of the offense.
